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Justifying Public Advocacy by Charities: When Does Political Activity Become Charitable? 
 
Lusina Ho, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong; Joseph C.W. Chan, University of Hong Kong 
 
In common law jurisdictions, it has been a well-entrenched rule that charitable organizations must not substantially 
engage in political activities.  Apart from party politics, these include, in American law, “attempt[s] to influence 
legislation” and in English law, the even broader formulation of “advocacy to change law or policy”.   
 
Unfortunately, some grounds offered by the judiciary to justify such restrictions do not stand up to rigorous 
examination, such as that judges must deem existing law satisfactory, and are ill-equipped to (and in any event 
should not) decide whether a particular change of law is publicly beneficial.  Another ground, eloquently stated by 
Judge Learned Hand in Slee v Commissioner, 42 F 2d 184 (2d Cir 1930), that political agitations are controversial 
and must be conducted without public subvention, is too broad-brush to help distinguish between political activities 
that deserve charitable tax subsidy and those that do not.  Nor does it explain why political agitations must be 
controversial and why controversies are fatal to tax subsidy.  In any event, these justifications fail to catch up with the 
modern role of charities to build a rigorous civil society (see Report of the Advisory Group on Campaigning and the 
Voluntary Sector (London: Advisory Group, 2007); A Dunn, IJNL (2008) vol 11, no 1, p 51; D Reiser (2011) 86 Notre 
Dame L Rev 1).   
 
While existing justifications are inadequate, it is not the intention of the present paper to argue for a radical, wholesale 
lifting of the restrictions on public advocacy. Rather, its aim is to examine existing justifications, and articulate an 
appropriate justification for charitable tax subsidy of such activities.  In particular, it argues that the key to 
distinguishing between acceptable and non-acceptable public advocacy lies in whether they are obviously beneficial 
to the public, and hence deserve the same extent of tax subsidy as charitable activities.  For this purpose, advocacy 
for changes of law is not obviously beneficial to the public, because such changes typically involve redistributing 
resources (in the widest sense of the term, including rights and freedoms) in society in a zero-sum manner, and 
hence produce negative impact on certain groups in society.  It is in this sense that Judge Hand’s remark about the 
controversial nature of political agitation can best be understood.  In contrast, a particular activity that may be hotly 
contested but does not involve a change of law (such as providing help to sex workers or advice on abortion to 
pregnant teenagers) is still charitable, as long as it falls within the recognised categories of publicly beneficial (or 
charitable) activities.   This is because they do not redistribute resources in society through a change of law or policy.   
 
Once the importance of public benefit in distinguishing acceptable and non-acceptable public advocacy is recognised, 
the paper further argues that public advocacy that involves a fair exposition of the facts and reasons on both sides of 
the issue should enjoy charitable tax subsidy, for the following reason.  Even when a proposed change of law is 
controversial and not obviously beneficial to the public, if the viewpoint is advanced upon a fair exposition of the facts 
and reasons on both sides of the issue, such an endeavor is of obvious benefit to the public.  Like free speech, it 
allows members of the public to hear the pros and cons of the debate, and promotes public deliberation.  It should be 
distinguished from public advocacy that does not such expositions, but instead merely contacting or encouraging 
others to contact legislative or executive personnel to urge them to change the law.  The latter does not carry the 
public benefit of promoting and enhancing public deliberation.  
 
On this basis, the following significant but measured relaxations of the existing law are in order.  First, the current ban 
(in the UK) on charities from having political purposes and restrictions (in USA, Canada, and the UK) that public 
advocacy be insubstantial or in furtherance to their charitable purpose(s) should be lifted, as long as the lobbying is 
conducted upon a fair exposition of the relevant facts and reasons.  Secondly, charitable subsidy should not be 
limited, as is in the present law, to activities that raise public awareness, provide unbiased education, and promote 
the law to be observed.  Put another way, even organizations with the exclusive purpose of publicly advocating for a 
change of law or policy (crucially) upon fair exposition of reasons and facts should be regarded as charitable.  
 
Such a proposal represents a measured step towards a more progressive legal framework.  Most importantly, the 
present paper offers a sound explanation to distinguish public advocacy activities that should enjoy charitable tax 
subsidy from those that should not.  It represents a significant and principled step towards aligning the rules 
restricting public advocacy with the rationale and justifications behind them. 
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